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Abstract
This paper introduces a formal system Σ of subjective epistemic reasoning that encodes a method
of reasoning with conditions of knowledge and belief. The conditions are subjective in that they
are taken from the perspective of an agent’s perception of his own state of knowledge or belief
with respect to his observable world. Belief is measured along a series of linguistic degrees, e.g.,
strongly believes, fairly confidently believes, somewhat disbelieves, etc., and knowledge is taken
as unequivocal belief. The system employs a novel, dual-leveled language that follows fuzzy logic
by interpreting the logical or and and as the arithmetical max and min. Numerous properties of Σ ,
illustrating its intuitive appeal for the intended purpose, are derived.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A central aim of the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is to create computational
agents that replicate the activities of the human mind. A major effort in this regard this
has sought to devise models of natural reasoning processes wherein a knowledge base,
representing an agent’s view of its operational environment, changes and evolves over time.
This emerged first as the study of nonmonotonic reasoning and subsequently as the study of
belief revision. These investigations in turn evoked a special concern with “knowledge” and
“belief” and the task of devising logical formalisms that capture everyday human reasoning
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with these ideas. In due course, the chapter from Philosophy that deals with these issues,
known as epistemic logic, became folded into AI as part of the ongoing developments.
This paper briefly reviews some of the foundational works in this area, with the aim
of distinguishing first between knowledge and belief, and then between objective and
subjective knowledge. In this context it argues that, whereas most efforts to formalize our
reasoning about knowledge have concerned the objective variety, from an agent-oriented
perspective the subjective variety is actually more pertinent.
It next introduces the syntax and semantics for a logic Σ of subjective epistemic
reasoning that is aimed at capturing the associated notions. This includes linguistic degrees
of belief such as strongly believes, fairly confidently believes, somewhat disbelieves, etc.,
as wells as knowledge, where this is taken as conviction or unequivocal belief. It is shown
how Σ achieves the desired end by delineating some key formulas of its language that are
validated by the semantics. Taken together, these results show that Σ bears intuitive appeal
for the intended applications.
2. Knowledge and belief
The classical view of the relationship between knowledge and belief, attributed to
Plato’s “Theaetetus” (cf. [22]), is that
“knowledge is justified true belief”.
This view was challenged in 1963 by Gettier [11] with two examples showing how it is
possible for someone (an agent) to be justified in believing a proposition that is true, but
nonetheless cannot be said to know the proposition is true inasmuch as the justifications for
his belief are predicated on assumptions that are false. In effect, Gettier’s argument is that
one cannot be said to know that a proposition is true without also knowing why it is true.
This sparked a series of investigations by others, mostly focusing on the extent to
which justified beliefs may be regarded as true. The next 15 years of such studies were
summarized by Lenzen [22], who affirmed Gettier’s conclusions and took these to imply
that the concept of knowledge cannot be reduced to other epistemic notions. This view, in
turn, has been challenged by Voorbraak [37] in the context of a detailed logical formulation
based on Kripke-style possible-worlds semantics. A chapter of [37] argues that, in order
to be knowledge, a belief need only be justified by the same reasons for which it is true.
Thus, in this sense, the classical view can be reaffirmed.
Whether one accepts or reject the classical view, however, no one seems to question
whether a proposition, in order to be knowledge, must at least be true. Contrapositively, it
seems generally agreed that one cannot be said to “know” something that is false. Empirical
knowledge, in particular, necessarily always conforms to the actual state of the empirical
world.
This position was taken in the well-known treatise by Hintikka [19]. It has subsequently
appeared throughout investigations along these lines within the field of AI. Works of this
genre include numerous publications by Konolige, Fagin, Halpern, and others (cf. [4–6,
14–16,20,23,26]). As with Voorbraak, these mostly employ the familiar possible-worlds
semantics and distinguish between the two notions in terms of what worlds the agent either
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knows or believes to be possible. Moreover, most have not attempted to exploit the classical
view discussed above in order to combine the two notions in a unified system, but rather
deal only with each of knowledge and belief separately. An exception, however, is the work
by Kraus and Lehmann [21], which accounts for both notions in a single formalism and
additionally introduces a temporal component to express the persistence of beliefs in time.
For the most part, such systems explicitly express the view that a proposition cannot be
regarded as knowledge unless it is true by means of the axiom
KP → P.
The fact that so many of the proposed formulations include this axiom emphasizes its
widespread acceptance.
This is of course natural as long as one is discussing an agent’s capacity for knowledge
of objective truths. From an agent-oriented standpoint, however, it may be questioned
whether this is in fact the correct approach. For, in practice, there is never complete
certainty that an agent’s view of the empirical world is true. This is especially the case
with computational agents, whose knowledge bases are always, except in very trivial
environments, only partial descriptions of the agent’s operational domain.
Indeed even in those cases where a correspondence between perceptions and actual facts
seem inviolate, the agent’s comprehension of his external state of affairs is never wholly
complete. There is always the possibility that extenuating circumstances can render his
perceptions invalid. For example, if John observes that Mary is wearing a red hat, and this
is corroborated by John’s friend Bob, then one is inclined to affirm that Mary’s hat is in
fact red and that the perceptions are correct. This does not rule out the (admittedly remote)
possibility, however, that both John and Bob were beset with temporary color blindness,
and that Mary’s hat was in fact green. Hence, from the agent’s vantage point, his personal
convictions of knowledge regarding the external world are, at best, only beliefs, albeit ones
possibly held without equivocation.
A view somewhat in this vein was expressed by Moses and Shoham [26] in a
formulation of belief as defeasible knowledge. Here the idea is that an agent can be held to
“know” something until such time as he discovers countervailing information, after which
the subject item becomes recognized as merely a belief. Since this defines belief in terms
of knowledge, it appears to effectively reverse the classical relation expressed above. It
must be considered, however, whether defeasible knowledge is in fact knowledge in the
earlier sense. For if a conviction of knowledge can be overturned at a later time, then the
presumed “knowledge” was not originally a complete and correct depiction of the external
world. Hence it always was at best a belief, even though a belief held with firm conviction.
The argument, then, is that an agent’s assertion that he knows a proposition P is more
exactly an assertion that he is convinced that P is true, and it does not rule out the
possibility that his conviction is in error. Thus an agent’s assertions of knowledge are at
best “justified beliefs”. In this respect, we return to a semblance of the classical view, but
with an important exception: we do not claim that these beliefs need be “true”.
This opens the door for nonmonotonicity in that, if an agent is convinced that he knows
something to be true, then he can be expected to act accordingly until such time as he
may discover evidence to the contrary. When this occurs then he will need to reassess his
position and reclassify the proposition as a formerly held belief.
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Now when one separates the agent’s convictions from the question of whether these
correctly correspond to the agent’s external world, one is then dealing only with subjective
conditions of knowledge and belief. In other words, in the subjective realm of the agent’s
own thinking processes, the agent can be convinced that a certain proposition is true, even
when it is not.
This is important from an agent-oriented perspective because whether the agent’s
convictions of knowledge are in fact true does not matter in terms of his own behavior;
it matters only that he is acting as if they are true. Note also that this does not exclude
beliefs that are held with absolute conviction, but which the agent nonetheless refers to
as “belief” rather than “knowledge” (e.g., a belief in God). Here it is merely a matter of
terminology, since an agent having such strong convictions will conduct his actions as if
these were in fact items of true knowledge. On the other hand, if the agent acknowledges
that the basis of his action is at best a belief, and not necessarily confirmed knowledge,
then perhaps his actions will be undertaken with some trepidation, i.e., allowing for the
possibility that these actions may be in error.
For purposes of replicating natural human reasoning on a computer, it is therefore of
interest to develop models that capture this sort of reasoning in a well-defined formalism.
The study of formalisms that deal with the notion of belief independently of the notion of
knowledge is known as doxastic logic. The Lenzen paper [22] additionally surveys work in
this area as of its publication date and introduces a new formulation where belief is defined
in terms of probabilities. Works along these lines within AI include that of Konolige [20]
and Fagin and Halpern [4,5]. The former defines belief in terms of some notions of “belief
set” and “deduction structure”, somewhat along the same lines as the derivation path and
dynamic reasoning systems described in the following. The latter use an adaptation of the
familiar possible-worlds semantics.
In this vein also is the “autoepistemic logic” devised by Moore [24,25]. This constitutes
an early effort to formalize an agent’s reasoning about his own knowledge and beliefs.
Moore’s logic is obtained by augmenting the classical predicate logic with a modal operator
L, standing for the (subjective) knows or believes. That system was shown to capture
several key aspects of the everyday reasoning with these ideas.
Another system, somewhat along the same lines, has been proposed by Thijsse [35,
36]. This employs a “dual-leveled” formalism wherein a “partial logic” (a weakening
of classical logic) comprises an “internal” logic whose propositions are built up in the
usual way from propositional variables using the connectives for negation and conjunction.
These propositions are then modified with belief operators to become formulas of an
“external” logic that obeys the laws of classical logic. As will be seen, this bears similarity
with the approach taken here.
A well-known alternative treatment of belief is Dempster–Shafer theory [33]. This has
been studied by Halpern and Fagin [14] in comparison with still another interpretation
based on generalized probabilities. Dempster–Shafer theory is concerned with delineating
correct rules for combining evidence, where this evidence supports beliefs about the
empirical world. Thus it seeks to specify how people should reason about their beliefs,
not how they actually do.
Th literature is nowadays replete with writings related to agent-oriented systems. In
particular is the version of agent-oriented programming described by Shoham [34]. This
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bears similarity with the notion of a “dynamic reasoning system” referred to in the
following Section 4. The volume [8] edited by Ford, Glymour, and Hayes is an interesting
collection of essays along these same lines.
3. The system Σ of subjective epistemic reasoning
The present system Σ has much the same aim as the system of “rational (introspective
belief” devised by Voorbraak [37], and it might have been similarly named. The term
“epistemic” has been adopted here, however, to emphasize that the system is intended as
a model of the agent’s awareness of its own internal conditions of knowledge and belief.
In other words, when a formula of the form KP is posited in the system, this is taken
as representing the agent’s affirming that P is being held as an item of it’s knowledge,
and when a formula of the form BP is posited, this is taken as representing the agent’s
affirming that P is being held as a belief. Moreover, when deductions are made from the
agent’s current set of knowledge and beliefs, these are viewed as conscious acts made by
the agent, so also are items of which the agent is aware. Taking awareness as synonymous
with conscious knowledge, this warrants the system’s being referred to as epistemic.
Whether Σ correctly captures natural reasoning with linguistic expressions of knowl-
edge and belief is of course difficult to assess, but the system clearly has intuitive appeal.
This is borne out by the collection of propositions it validates. In particular, these include
an interpretation of the logical or and and in terms of the arithmetical max and min, in the
context of the given set of linguistic belief degrees. To illustrate, suppose an agent fairly
confidently believe that the economy is healthy, and it strongly disbelieves that there can
be any useful number system in which 1 = 0. Then the agent has a natural tendency to
determine its degree of belief that at least one of these assertions holds as being the greater
of the two degrees, i.e., it fairly confidently believe that either one or the other is true. Sim-
ilarly, given the same conditions and degrees of belief, the agent is inclined to determine
its degree of belief that both hold simultaneously as being the lesser of two degrees, i.e.,
it strongly disbelieves that both can simultaneously be true. In what follows it will be seen
that Σ provides a formal language suitable for expressing such propositions and a seman-
tics that validates them. The system will also be seen to bear other intuitively reasonable
properties, particularly with respect to the interrelationships between its various logical
connectives and belief modifiers.
The core of Σ is patterned after a logic developed previously for reasoning with
graduated linguistic expressions of likelihood [31,32]. This in turn employs a dual-leveled
style of formalism presented initially in [30]. These logics owe an obvious debt to the
literature on fuzzy logic. First, their use of the arithmetic max and min to define the logical
or and and derives from Zadeh’s first paper on the subject [38]. Second, these systems
borrow Zadeh’s notion of a “linguistic variable” (cf. [39]). Specifically, Belief is here
treated as a variable of this type. Last, these works have been inspired by the same aims
as expressed by Zadeh to create methods for “computing with words” [40,41] and, more
recently, to devise a “computational theory of perceptions” [42]. While my own works
have adopted a more symbolic approach—in contrast with Zadeh’s emphasis on semantic
inference—they are nonetheless directed toward the same goals.
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3.1. Formal languageLet us adopt the following notations:
B4 for unequivocally believes,
B3 for strongly believes,
B2 for fairly confidently believes,
B1 for somewhat believes,
B0 for neither believes nor disbelieves,
B−1 for somewhat disbelieves,
B−2 for fairly confidently disbelieves,
B−3 for strongly disbelieves,
B−4 for unequivocally disbelieves.
These are taken to express various grades of strength in the agent’s disposition towards
believing in a given proposition. In particular, B0 expresses uncertainty, either in the sense
that the agent has information to both support and refute the proposition in question, or
in the sense that the agent suffers from a complete lack of information regarding the truth
of falsehood of the proposition. Distinguishing between these two varieties of uncertainly
requires a semantically richer system than the one being considered here.
Both the number of these notations and their interpretations largely arbitrary. In order
for the following formalism to maintain its coherence, it is only necessary that the
subscripting of the qualifiers be symmetrical about 0. Thus the above selection should
be viewed as being merely for purposes of illustrating a general methodology. The
semantics (Section 3), however, implicitly also requires that B0 represents a position
of complete equivocation (uncertainty) and that the topmost and bottommost qualifiers
represent positions of complete conviction (certainty).
The language for Σ is defined as follows. As symbols we shall have: the propositional
variables p1,p2, . . . , the logical connectives ¬,∨, ·¬, ∨˙, the left and right parentheses “(”
and “)”, and the belief operators B4, . . . ,B−4. The formulas for Σ will be the combined
members of the following:
F1 = {P | P is pi, i = 0,1, . . .},
F2 = F1 ∪
{¬P, (P ∨Q) | P,Q ∈ F1 ∪ F2}, 1
F3 = {BiP | P ∈ F2, i =−4, . . . ,4},
F4 = F3 ∪
{ ·¬P, (P ∨˙Q) | P,Q ∈ F3 ∪ F4}.
In the section below, the formulas in F2 are interpreted as comprising a multivalent logic,
while the belief formulas in F4 are interpreted as obeying the rules of the classical bivalent
logic.
1 This notation abbreviates the usual inductive definition, in this case the smallest class of formulas containing
F1 together with all formulas that can be built up from formulas in F1 in the two prescribed ways.
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Further connectives can be introduced in the usual manner as abbreviations:
(P ∧Q) for ¬(¬P ∨¬Q),
(P ∧˙Q) for ·¬( ·¬P ∨˙ ·¬Q),
(P →˙Q) for ( ·¬P ∨˙Q),
(P ↔˙Q) for ((P →˙Q) ∧˙ (Q →˙ P)).
In addition, one can introduce connectives AL and AM, standing for at least and at most
by
ALBiP for BiP ∨˙ · · · ∨˙ B4P,
AMBiP for B−4P ∨˙ · · · ∨˙BiP .
These definitions capture the usual meanings of the respective terms in application to the
given belief operators.
The operator K for knows is defined by taking
KP for B4P.
This is in keeping with the foregoing discussion inasmuch as it defines knowledge as
unequivocal belief (conviction of truth). This distinguishes it from the K appearing in
previous works.
It is natural to introduce unsubscripted letters B, D, and U for believes, disbelieves, and
is uncertain about by
BP for B1P ∨˙B2P ∨˙B3P ∨˙B4P,
DP for B−1P ∨˙B−2P ∨˙B−3P ∨˙ B−4P,
UP for B0P.
Parentheses will be dropped when the intended grouping is clear, based on the usual
precedence rules; associativity is assumed to be to the right. Formulas without belief
modifiers are first- or lower-level formulas, and those with belief modifiers are second- or
upper-level. Examples of formulas expressing meaningful statements appear in the sections
below.
One may note that the present formalism explicitly rules out “mixed” formulas such as
P →˙ B3P.
The reason for this is that to assert a proposition P in any logical formalism is normally
taken to posit P as being “true”, and this implicitly amounts to positing objective truth.
Since the present system is aimed to model only assertions of subjective truth, such
unqualified assertions are not appropriate. One does have a subjective analog of P in KP ,
however, and formulas of the form
KP →˙B3P
are included in the above language. Such formulas will not be validated by the semantics
forΣ , however, since here the various grades of belief are regarded as semantically distinct.
The language of Σ also rules out nested modification, expressing such propositions
as that the agent “knows that it knows”, or “believes that it believes”, or “knows that it
believes”, and so on. Accordingly this leaves out the “introspective” axioms considered
in prior works. This omission is intentional, simply to keep the present semantics from
becoming too complex. Such may be considered, however, in a future work.
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3.2. SemanticsAs was mentioned, Belief is here treated as a linguistic variable in the sense of
[39]. Specifically, this consists of (i) a set of primitive linguistic terms (propositional
variables, connectives, belief modifiers, etc.), (ii) a grammar that specifies how to build
up more complex expressions by using various rules of combination, and (iii) a mapping
that associates each such expression with a well-defined meaning in some interpretation
domain. Items (i) and (ii) have been provided above. Item (iii) is given by the definitions
below.
The semantics for Σ consists of some belief mappings β , each of which associates each
lower-level formula with a number in [0,1], and some truth valuations v, each of which
associates each upper-level formula with a truth value, T or F . As will be seen, every
valuation v is defined in terms of some given mapping β , and is uniquely determined by
that β .
A belief mapping is a function β : F2 →[0,1] satisfying, for any propositional variable
P ,
β(P ) ∈ [0,1]
and for any lower-level P and Q,
β(¬P)= 1− β(P ),
β(P ∨Q)=max[β(P ),β(Q)].
From these definitions we have
β(P ∧Q)= β(¬(¬P ∨¬Q))= 1−max[1− β(P ),1− β(Q)]
=min[β(P ),β(Q)].
For the truth valuations v, first let
ι4 = [1,1] (singleton 1),
ι3 =
[ 6
7 ,1
)
,
ι2 =
[ 5
7 ,
6
7
)
,
ι1 =
[ 4
7 ,
5
7
)
,
ι0 =
( 3
7 ,
4
7
)
,
ι−1 =
( 2
7 ,
3
7
]
,
ι−2 =
( 1
7 ,
2
7
]
,
ι−3 =
(
0, 17
]
,
ι−4 = [0,0] (singleton 0).
Then, given any belief mapping β , define v : F4 →[T ,F ] by, for all i =−4, . . . ,4,
D.G. Schwartz / Artificial Intelligence 148 (2003) 177–195 185
v(BiP )= T iff β(P ) ∈ ιi ,
v( ·¬P)= T iff v(P )= F ,
v(P ∨˙Q)= T iff either v(P )= T or v(Q)= T .
Given these definitions, it is easily established that
v(P ∧˙Q)= T iff v(P )= T and v(Q)= T ,
v(P →˙Q)= T iff v(P )= F or v(Q)= T ,
v(P ↔˙Q)= T iff v(P →˙Q)= T and v(Q →˙ P)= T .
Thus all the upper-level logical connectives behave in the normal ways. It may also be
verified that
v(ALBiP )= T iff β(P ) ∈ ιj for some j  i,
v(AMBiP )= T iff β(P ) ∈ ιj for some j  i,
v(BP)= T iff v(B1P)= T or . . . or v(B4P)= T ,
v(DP)= T iff v(B−1P)= T or . . . or v(B−4P)= T .
An upper-level formula P will be a tautology with respect to this semantics, if v(P ) = T
for all valuations v. Since every valuation v is defined in terms of an underlying belief
mapping β , this means that P evaluates to T for all possible assignments of belief values
to its constituent propositional variables.
3.3. Basic system properties
It follows from the foregoing that the upper-level formulas obey the rules of classical
propositional calculus (CPC) as described, for example, in [17]. To wit, all formulas of the
forms
(
P →˙ (Q →˙ P))((
P →˙ (Q →˙R)) →˙ ((P →˙Q) →˙ (P →˙R)))(
( ·¬P →˙ ·¬Q) →˙ (Q →˙ P))
are tautologies, and the rule of Modus Ponens,
From P and (P →˙Q) infer Q
is valid in the sense that, whenever one has v(P ) = T and v(P →˙Q)= T , one also has
v(Q)= T .
These facts may be established via the usual methods. To illustrate, for the first of the
above, suppose that for some valuation v we have
v
(
P →˙ (Q →˙ P))= F.
Then, by the definition of →˙,
v(P )= T and v(Q →˙ P)= F
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where the latter implies, again by the definition of →˙,
v(Q)= T and v(P )= F.
But then we have that v(P )= T and v(P )= F , which is a contradiction. Hence there can
be no v that makes the given formula F , so that it must be a tautology.
By the “Adequacy Theorem” proven in [17] it is known that the above formulas and rule
comprise a complete axiomatization of CPC. Thus, given that these items are all valid in
the present semantics, it follows that this semantics validates all classical tautologies that
are expressible as upper-level formulas of Σ .
More pertinent to the present work is that the following are valid for all i and j :
BiP ∧˙BjQ →˙Bmin[i,j ](P ∧Q) (1)
and
BiP ∧˙BjQ →˙Bmax[i,j ](P ∨Q). (2)
These express the kind of reasoning discussed in Section 1. To see this, let P be
a propositional variable standing for “The economy is healthy”, let Q be a different
propositional variable standing for “There can be a useful number system in which 1= 0”,
let i = 2, and let j =−3. Then (1) expresses
“If the agent fairly confidently believes that the economy is healthy, and the agent
strongly disbelieves that there can be a useful number system in which 1 = 0, then it
strongly disbelieves that both are true.”
Given the same assumptions, (2) expresses
“If the agent fairly confidently believes that the economy is healthy, and the agent
strongly disbelieves that there can be a useful number system in which 1 = 0, then it
fairly confidently believes that at least one of these are true.”
Formula (1) may be established in the following manner. Suppose that
v
(BiP ∧˙ BjQ →˙Bmin[i,j ](P ∧Q))= F.
Then, by the definition of →˙,
v(BiP ∧˙BjQ)= T (3)
and
v
(Bmin[i,j ](P ∧Q))= F. (4)
From (3), by the definition of ∧˙,
v(BiP )= T and v(BjQ)= T
which, by the definition of v, means
β(P ) ∈ ιi and β(Q) ∈ ιj
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givingβ(P ∧Q)=min[β(P ),β(Q)] ∈ ιmin[i,j ]
by the definition of β . But from (4), by the definition of v, β(P ∧Q) /∈ ιmin[i,j ]. This is
a contradiction; hence (1) is a tautology, for all i and j . Formula (2) may be validated
similarly.
One can develop a kind of of converse proposition for each of (1) and (2) as the formulas
Bi (P ∧Q) →˙ (BiP ∧˙ALBiQ) ∨˙ (BiQ ∧˙ALBiP ), (5)
Bi (P ∨Q) →˙ (BiP ∧˙AMBiQ) ∨˙ (BiQ ∧˙AMBiP ). (6)
The meanings expressed by these are intuitively plausible, given the usual meanings of “at
least”, and “at most”. Formula (5) can be shown a tautology as follows. Suppose
v
(Bi (P ∧Q))= T . (7)
Then, by definition of the valuations v (for →˙), it is sufficient to show
v(BiP ∧˙ALBiQ) ∨˙ (BiQ ∧˙ALBiP ))= T
which, by the definition of v (for ∨˙), amounts to showing that either
v(BiP ∧˙ALBiQ)= T (8)
or
v(BiQ ∧˙ALBiP )= T . (9)
From (7), by the property of ∧ cited in Section 3.2,
min
(
β(P ),β(Q)
) ∈ ιi .
This implies that either
β(P ) ∈ ιi and β(Q) ∈ ιj , for some j  i, (10)
or
β(Q) ∈ ιi and β(P ) ∈ ιj , for some j  i, (11)
But then, by the properties of ∧˙ and AL cited in Section 3.2, (10) implies (8), and (11)
implies (9). Formula (6) may be verified similarly.
Other tautologies of this system are
Bi¬P ↔˙ B−iP , (12)
·¬BiP ↔˙
.∨
−4j4,j =i
BjP . (13)
The former shows that the lower-level negation interacts with the belief operators in
intuitively plausible ways. To illustrate, if i = 2, (12) says that “the agent fairly confidently
believes not-P ” means the same as “the agent fairly confidently disbelieves P ”, and if
i =−3, (12) says that “the agent strongly disbelieves not-P ” means the same as “the agent
strongly believes P ”. The latter formula, on the other hand, does not reflect an naturally
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occurring property of negation, but rather expresses only the logical consequence of the
various belief operators having been defined to be semantically mutually exclusive.
To verify (12), observe that
1− β(P ) ∈ ιi iff β(P ) ∈ ι−i
which, by the definition of β , gives
β(¬P) ∈ ιi iff β(P ) ∈ ι−i
which in turn, by the definition of v, gives
v(Bi¬P)= T iff v(B−iP )= T .
The latter leads to (12) by analysis of the definition of ↔˙. Verifying (13) is more tedious
but straightforward.
Two immediate consequences of (12) are that
K¬P ↔˙B−4P, B−4¬P ↔˙KP
are tautologies. These express further intuitively plausible consequences of the definitions,
to wit, the agent knows that not-P if and only if he unequivocally disbelieves P , and he
unequivocally disbelieves not-P if and only if he knows P . Three tautologies that can be
verified along the same lines as (13) are
·¬BP ↔˙DP ∨˙ UP,
·¬DP ↔˙ BP ∨˙ UP,
·¬UP ↔˙ BP ∨˙DP.
A particularly useful result is that, with respect to the connectives ¬, ∨, and ∧, the
lower-level of Σ imposes a structure on the interval [0,1] that has at least the richness of a
De Morgan lattice (an in-depth analysis of such algebras may be found in [31, p. 38]). This
is established by verifying that the following are tautologies.
BiP ↔˙ Bi¬¬P (involution)
Bi (P ∨Q) ↔˙ Bi (Q∨ P) (commutativity)
Bi (P ∧Q) ↔˙ Bi (Q∧ P)
Bi
(
(P ∨Q)∨R) ↔˙ Bi(P ∨ (Q∨R)) (associativity)
Bi
(
(P ∧Q)∧R) ↔˙ Bi(P ∧ (Q∧R))
Bi
(
P ∨ (Q∧R)) ↔˙ Bi((P ∨Q)∧ (P ∨R)) (distributivity)
Bi
(
P ∧ (Q∨R)) ↔˙ Bi((P ∧Q)∨ (P ∧R))
Bi
(
P ∨ (P ∧Q)) ↔˙ Bi (P ) (absorption)
Bi
(
P ∧ (P ∨Q)) ↔˙ Bi (P )
Bi (P ∨Q) ↔˙ Bi¬(¬P ∧¬Q) (De Morgan’s laws)
Bi (P ∧Q) ↔˙ Bi¬(¬P ∨¬Q).
Establishing most of these is routine. For the absorption and De Morgan’s laws, consider
the cases (i) β(P ) β(Q) and (ii) β(P ) < β(Q), and for the distributivity laws, consider
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Table 1
Chaining with the Łukasiewicz →
4 3 2 1 0 −1 −2 −3 −4
4 4, 4 4, 3 4, 2 4, 1 4, 0 4, −1 4, −2 4, −3 4, −4
3 4, 3 3, 2 2, 1 1, 0 0, −1 −1, −2 −2, −3 −3, −4 Any
2 4, 2 2, 1 1, 0 0, −1 −1, −2 −2, −3 −3, −4 Any Any
1 4, 1 1, 0 0, −1 −1, −2 −2, −3 −3, −4 Any Any Any
0 4, 0 0, −1 −1, −2 −2, −3 −3, −4 Any Any Any Any
−1 4, −1 −1, −2 −2, −3 −3, −4 Any Any Any Any Any
−2 4, −2 −2, −3 −3, −4 Any Any Any Any Any Any
−3 4, −3 −3, −4 Any Any Any Any Any Any Any
−4 4, −4 Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Any
the cases (i) β(P ) β(Q) β(R), (ii) β(P ) β(R) β(Q), (iii) β(Q) β(P ) β(R),
(iv) β(Q) β(R) β(P ), (v) β(R) β(P ) β(Q), and (vi) β(R) β(Q) β(P ).
This shows that, as a reasoning system, Σ is quite strong. It is not as rich as a Boolean
algebra, however, since it does not have unit and zero elements, i.e., there are no lower-level
formulas that map identically to either 0 or 1.
3.4. Inference for the lower level
The literature on fuzzy logic is rife with varieties of multi-valued modes of inference.
The paper [29] examined 10 such operators, and there are many others. Among these the
most well-known is the Łukasiewicz →, defined for the infinitary logic ℵ1 (cf. [27]). This
may be introduced into Σ in the following manner.2 Expand the symbol set to include the
connective→, extend the definition of the set F2 to include formulas of the form (P →Q),
and extend the mappings β by
β(P →Q)=min[1,1− β(P )+ β(Q)].
Then the question arises as to the properties of this connective. In particular, it is of
interest to consider the status of formulas expressing inference chaining:
Bi (P →Q) ∧˙Bj (Q→R) →˙Bk(P → R). (14)
The issue is, given choices for i and j from 4, . . . ,−4, for what corresponding k will the
above formula be a tautology. It turns out that, as is typical of fuzzy reasoning systems,
the precision of the consequences tends to degrade with successive applications of →. For
the present system, this means that, instead of formulas of the form (14), we must consider
formulas of the more general form
Bi (P →Q) ∧˙Bj (Q→R)→˙
Bk(P →R) ∨˙ · · · ∨˙Bk′(P → R). (15)
The results of the analysis are shown in Table 1. Row labels are i’s, column labels
are j ’s, and the content of the i, j cell is the corresponding k, k′ pair. For example, if
2 This adapts a similar discussion that appeared in [32] and corrects a technical error in the previous analysis.
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i = 1 (somewhat believes) and j = 4 (unequivocally believes), then k = 4 (unequivocally
believes) and k′ = 1 (somewhat believes). The cells containing “Any” indicate i, j for
which any choices of k, k′ will result in a tautology.
These table entries were determined in the following manner. Given i and j , assume
that
v
(Bi (P →Q))= T and v(Bj (Q→ R))= T .
Then
β(P →Q) ∈ ιi and β(Q→ R) ∈ ιj .
It is desired to determine, for each i and j , the range of values in [0,1] that this imposes
on β(P → R). Observe that, by the definition of β for →, for any P ′,Q′,
β(P ′ →Q′)=
{
1, if β(P ′) β(Q′),
1− β(P ′)+ β(Q′), if not.
We must consider four cases. Let us write p,q, r , respectively, for β(P ),β(Q),β(R).
Case i = 4 and j = 4. Then, by the above observation,p  q and q  r , which together
imply p  r . Hence β(P →R)= 1, and we can choose k = k′ = 4.
Case i = 4 and j < 4. Suppose ιj = [a, b]. (If ιj happens to be open at one or both
ends, then one must adjust the inequalities accordingly, but the same line of reasoning as
shown here will apply.) It follows that
p  q and a  1− q + r  b.
The former yields
1− p+ r  1− q + r
and this together with the latter gives 1 − p + r  a, which is the best bound we can
place on β(P → R) given the available information. Thus we take k = 4 and k′ = j . This
completes the remaining cells in the top row of the table.
Case i < 4 and j = 4. This is analogous to the above. Let ιi = [a, b]. Then
a  1− p+ q  b and q  r.
The latter yields
1− p+ r  1− p+ q
which together with the former gives 1−p+ r  a, and this is the best bound we can place
on β(P → R). Thus we take k = 4 and k′ = i . This completes the remaining cells in the
leftmost column of the table.
Case i < 4 and j < 4. Here let ιi = [a, b] and ιj = [a′, b′] (with caveats about endpoints
as above). There are three subcases.
(a) Cells above the diagonal. We are given that
a  1− p+ q  b and a′  1− q + r  b′.
The left endpoint of the desired interval for β(P → R) can be determined as follows. The
above give
1− p+ q  a and 1− q + r  a′.
D.G. Schwartz / Artificial Intelligence 148 (2003) 177–195 191
These imply
1− p  a − q and r  a′ − 1+ q.
Combining these gives
1− p+ r  (a − q)+ (a′ − 1+ q)
which simplifies to
1− p+ r  a + a′ − 1.
This is the desired left endpoint. The right endpoint can be determined similarly. The above
assumptions also give
1− p+ q  b and 1− q + r  b′
which imply
1− p  b− q and r  b′ − 1+ q.
Combining gives
1− p+ r  (b− q)+ (b′ − 1+ q)
which simplifies to
1− p+ r  b+ b′ − 1.
Substituting actual numbers for a and b yields all the remaining cells of the table above
the diagonal.
(b) Cells below the diagonal. For all such choices of i, j , where b, b′ are as above, it
turns out that
1− b+ b′ < 0.
But then, the last line above gives
1− p+ r < 0
which means
p− r > 1.
But this is impossible given that both p, r ∈ [0,1]. This means that, in these cases of
i, j , it is not possible to assign belief values to P , Q, and R in such a way that both
v(P → Q) = T and v(Q → R) = T . Since, as noted previously, each valuation v is
determined by some belief mapping β , it follows by the definitions of ∧˙ and →˙ that the
truth value of formula (15) will be T for all valuations v, regardless of the choice of k and
k′.
(c) Cells along the diagonal. In these cases, the above calculations give
1− a + a′ = − 17 and 1− b+ b′ = 17 .
Here those values < 0 are impossible for β(P → R), for the reasons discussed above,
while those  0 are possible. It turns out that the latter occur whenever the average of
β(P →Q) and β(Q→R) is  12 . To see this, observe that
1
2
[
(1− p+ q)+ (1− q + r)] 12
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simplifies to1− p+ r  0.
Thus, whenever both v(P →Q)= T and v(Q→ R)= T , their β values will satisfy this
property, and the acceptable range of values for β(P → R) will be [0, 17 ], corresponding
to k =−3, k′ = −4. This completes the verification of Table 1.
Note that, in the special case that k = 4, formula (15) may be written more succinctly
as
Bi (P →Q) ∧˙Bj (Q→R) →˙ALBk′(P → R).
This follows by definition of the operator AL.
4. Belief revision
It would be of interest to consider how Σ might be employed within the broader context
of a system for belief revision. The subject of belief revision is concerned with devising
formal representations of the manner in which an agent’s collection of beliefs may change
over time due to the acquisition of new information. This includes both the addition of
new beliefs to the current belief set and the removal of old beliefs in the light of newer
countervailing information. A seminal work in this area is Gärdenfors [9]. The subject has
received increased attention in recent years, particularly because of its close relation to
nonmonotonic reasoning (cf. Antoniou [1] for an overview). The collection [10] contains
further developments along these lines.
In [30] there was defined the notion of a dynamic reasoning system (DRS), which
explicitly portrays reasoning as an activity that takes place in time. This is obtained from
the conventional notion of formal logical system by lending special semantic status to the
concept of a derivation path (i.e., a proof). Introduction of new knowledge or beliefs into
the path occurs in two ways: either new propositions are added in the form of axioms, or
some propositions are derived from earlier ones by means of an inference rule. In either
case, the action is regarded as occurring in a discrete time step, and the new proposition is
labeled with a time stamp (an integer) indicating the step at which this occurred. Moreover,
for propositions entered into the path as a result of rule applications, the label additionally
contains a record of which inference rule was used and which propositions were employed
as premises. At any given time, the contents of the path is regarded is being the sum
total of the agent’s knowledge and beliefs as of that time. This is to be contrasted with
other systems of belief revision, which assume that the agent additionally knows all the
logical consequences of the basic belief set. Such systems are said to exhibit “logical
omniscience”. For an in-depth analysis of this issue, together with a manner of addressing
it, see the paper by Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [7].
The DRS framework allows one to portray belief revision as a form of back tracking
along the lines of the “truth maintenance”, or “reason maintenance”, systems devised by
Doyle [2,3]. If at some point in time a contradictory proposition is entered into the path,
then this triggers a process (possibly human assisted) of working backwards through the
path, following the information stored in the labels, looking for “culprit” formulas that may
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be held responsible for having led to the contradiction. Some of these formulas are then
removed from the set of currently held beliefs, so as to eliminate the contradiction, and one
uses the formula labels once again to forward chain through all deductions that originated
from these formulas and remove them from the current belief set as well. This process can
obviously give rise to complexity issues, but it is nonetheless both theoretically feasible
and finitary.
The notion of a DRS was proposed initially for encoding reasoning with a logic Q of
qualified syllogisms, which, as mentioned, served as the model after which the current logic
Σ has been patterned. Accordingly, it is not difficult to see how Σ could be cast in this
framework and thereby provided with suitable mechanisms for belief revision. The same
framework also provides a means for encoding rules for belief combination. For example,
if at some point in the path it is determined that P is strongly believed, and at some other
point it is determined that P is somewhat disbelieved, then at a later point a combination
rule can be applied to deduce that, e.g., P is only somewhat believed. It is planned to
elaborate the details of these manners of belief management in a future work.
5. Concluding remarks
It is of interest that the various lower-level operators, including the Łukasiewicz →, are
closed with respect to the intervals ι4, . . . , ι−4. That is, for each i , there is a j such that
if β(P ) ∈ ιi , then β(¬P) ∈ ιj
for each i, j , there is a k such that
if β(P ) ∈ ιi and β(Q) ∈ ιj , then β(P ∨Q) ∈ ιk
and similarly, for each i, j , there is a k such that
if β(P ) ∈ ιi and β(Q) ∈ ιj , then β(P →Q) ∈ ιk .
This means that, while the belief mappings are useful for providing an interpretation of
the linguistic terms Bi and for justifying the interpretations of the logical connectives, all
reasoning within Σ can be carried out as operations performed directly on these terms.
In the case of ∨, for example, one can set up a table analogous to Table 1, showing, for
each i, j , what should be the corresponding k such that, if BiP and BjQ are true, then
Bk(P ∨Q) is true. In other words, the valuations v can be defined in terms of such tables,
without reference to the belief mappings.
A consequence of this is that the semantics for Σ is not difficult to implement on a
computer. Programs that evaluate propositions according to such tables would not differ
much from those that evaluate formulas of classical propositional calculus according to the
usual truth tables.
Another issue is that of a semantically complete axiomatization for Σ . There have been
recent successes in axiomatizing what may be regarded as the core of fuzzy logic. Hähnle
[18] presents one such formalization for use in logic circuit design. A major undertaking
along these lines is that of Hájek [12] (cf. also Hájek and Godo [13]). That work explores
the extent to which the elements fuzzy logic can be expressed as a multivalent logic using
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only the language of first-order logic, and it provides semantic completeness results for all
the relevant formalisms.
How to go about axiomatizing the dual-leveled types of formalisms studied here,
however, is another matter. One such effort, capturing some aspects of fuzzy logic, is the
formal theory of “semantic equivalence” developed in [28]. There a semantic completeness
result made use of some deep theorems from abstract algebra. But it remains to be
determined whether such methods will apply here. Indeed the kind of interaction between
levels as expressed by lines (1) and (2) of Section 3.3 makes the system Σ somewhat
unique—and the task of axiomatizing it even more challenging. Exploration of this issue
has been reserved for a future work.
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